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The Good Samaritan Ideal and Beneficent 
Euthanasia: Conflicting Views of Mercy 
Arthur J. Dyck 
The debate over mercy killing 
involves quite different under-
standings of what it means to 
show mercy. Indeed, Webster's 
N ew World Dictionary attaches 
at least two quite different mean-
ings to the word mercy. On the 
one hand, mercy refers to a con-
straint against acting in certain 
ways. Mercy defined in this way 
is "a refraining from harming or 
punishing offenders, enemies, per-
sons in one's power, etc.'" To kill 
someone is a commonly recog-
nized form of harm, so that re-
fraining from killing someone, 
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particularly someone in one's 
power, can be seen as being merci-
ful. The association between 
"mercy" and "failing to kill or be 
killed" is rendered explicit when 
the dictionary fur the r defines 
mercy as "a fortunate thing; thing 
to be grateful for; blessing (a 
mercy he wasn't killed) ."2 
On the other hand, the diction-
ary defines mercy in still another 
way, as "a disposition to forgive, 
pity, or be kind" and as "kind or 
compassionate treatment; relief 
of suffering." '; What would con-
stitute relief of suffering is not 
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specified. The way is opened to 
consider killing as an act of mercy 
if, under certain circumstances, it 
is seen as the only or best way to 
relieve suffering. Thus one has 
come to speak of killing in certain 
instances as mercy killing. 
Increasingly the word "eu-
thanasia" is being used as a syno-
nym for mercy kiHing. Originally 
the Greek word euthanasia meant 
painless, happy death. This mean-
ing still appears as one definition 
of the term. However, a second 
meaning is added which specifies 
that euthanasia is an "act or 
method of causing death pain-
lessly, so as to end suffering: ad-
vocated by some as a way to deal 
with persons dying of incurable, 
painful diseases."4 In the light of 
current usage and for purposes of 
this essay, I am using "mercy 
killing" and "euthanasia" as syno-
nyms for "the deliberate induce-
ment of a quick, painless death." 
The problem I wish to pose in 
this essay is whether or not the 
desire and obligation to be merci-
ful commits us to a policy of eu-
thanasia. Some have claimed that 
there is a moral obligation to be 
merciful or beneficent and that 
beneficent euthanasia is, there-
fore, not only morally justifiable 
but morally obligatory. This is a 
claim that deserves the careful 
scrutiny of any morally conscien-
tious person. After evaluating cer-
tain- arguments for beneficent 
euth~nasia, I will t hen co~sider 
the possibility of an alternative 
notion of how an obligation to be 
merciful can be fulfilled in those 
situations where some would ar-
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gue that mercy killing is morally 
justified or even obligatory. 
The Ethic of Beneficent 
Euthanasia 
One of the most compelling 
cases for beneficent euthanasia 
has been offered by Marvin Kohl. ' 
According to Kohl, all of us have 
a prima facie obligation to act 
kindly. For the purposes of indi-
cating when euthanasia would be 
an act of kindness, he specifies the 
following sense in which an act 
can be described as kind: 
an act is kind if it (a) is in-
tended to be helpful ; (b) is done so 
that, if there be a ny expectation of 
receiving remuneration (or the 
like) , the individual would nonethe-
less act even if it became apparent 
that there was little chance of his 
expectation being realized ; a nd (c) 
results in beneficial treatment for 
the intended recipient. The Boy or 
Girl Scout helping an elderly man 
or woman cross the street, or the 
proverbial Good Sa maritan. are 
paradigm cases of kindness. 6 
From this definition of kind-
ness, Kohl argues that 
the necessary, a nd perhaps suffi-
cient, conditions for beneficent eu-
thanasia are that the act must 
involve a painless inducement to a 
quick death; that the act must re-
sult in beneficial treatment for the 
intended recipient; a nd that, aside 
from the desire to help the recipi-
ent, no other considerations are 
relevant [a combination of condi-
tions (a) and (b) F 
To further clarify precisely what 
he means by beneficent euthana-
sia, Kohl offers th~ rea de; two 
paradigm cases. The first case in-
volves patients: (1) suffering 
from an irremediable condition 
like cancer (disseminated car-
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cinoma metastasis); (2) with se-
vere pain; (3) clearly dying as a 
result of their condition; (4) vol-
untarily in favor of some means 
of "easy death; " and (5) that 
apart from the desire to help such 
patients, no other circumstances 
are relevant. Kohl cites another 
type of case as a paradigm: chil-
dren who are severely handi-
capped, for whom death is not 
imminent and who are not suffer-
ing pain. These two types of cases 
are quite different in Kohl's mind 
except in two important respects : 
both involve serious and irremedi-
able physical conditions and 
a rouse in others a wish to help. 
Kohl argues that in both types of 
circumstances, in d u c e d death 
would probably be considered an 
act of kindness by most persons. 
Kohl underlines the importance of 
this claim because 
if true it means that considerations 
of free choice, the imminence of 
death, a nd/ or the ex istence of pain 
are not a lways relevant, a t least not 
to judgments of kindness.K 
With these paradigms in mind 
and on the assumption that so-
cieties and their individual mem-
bers have a prima facie obligation 
to treat one another kindly, Kohl 
infers quite logically that bene-
ficent euthanasia, because it is a 
species of kindness, is a prima 
facie obligation. This conclusion 
seems obvious to Kohl but he re-
alizes that it is not obvious to 
everyone, given certain objections 
that have been raised against eu-
thanasia. Kohl, therefore, feels 
constrained to take up three such 
objections and offer what he takes 
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to be refutations of them: 
(1) Against "edge of the 
wedge" claims, he argues 
that a policy of beneficent 
euthanasia will result in 
mllllmlzmg suffering and 
maximizing kindly treat-
ment; 
(2 ) Against claims that homi-
cide is intrinsically unjust, 
he argues that beneficent 
euthanasia satisfies a fun-
damental need for human 
dignity; and 
(3) Against those who argue 
that we are not obligated 
to kill, even out of kind-
ness, he argues that failure 
to give help in the form of 
beneficent euthanasia is a 
fa ilure to live up to the 
Good Samaritan ideal. 
(1) The "Wedge" Argument 
Kohl interprets the "wedge" as 
claiming that if beneficent eutha-
nasia is morally justified, then 
euthanasia that cannot be con-
sidered to be beneficent will come 
to be practiced and justified. He 
sees "wedge" arguments as based 
upon two assumptions, first that 
all theories of euthanasia ulti-
mately rest upon a principle of 
utility, and second, that all 
theories of utility are the same as 
those held by the Nazis, the im-
plication being that great cruel-
ties rather than kindness will re-
sult from such theories. 
Kohl disassociates himself from 
any view that would advocate eu-
thanasia for economic purposes. 
He distinguishes utility from 
beneficence. The duty of bene-
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ficence is in his view the duty to 
minimize suffering and to maxi-
mize kindly treatment. If there is 
a "slippery slide" that results 
from policies of beneficent eutha-
nasia, it will be in the direction of 
minimizing suffering and maxi-
mizing kindly treatment. Second-
ly, he distinguishes between the 
kindest way of doing X and the 
kindest way of treating a human 
being as a human being. Bene-
ficent euthanasia has for its ob-
jective not merely death with dig-
nity, but living and dying with 
dignity. Again the goal is to mini-
mize suffering and to maximize 
kindness. 
In dealing with the "wedge" 
argument, Kohl has not yet con-
fronted it in its most powerful 
form. A "wedge" argument does 
not have to predict that certain 
practices will follow from another. 
A "wedge" argument is concerned 
with the form or logic of moral 
justifications. 
Consider, for example, Kohl's 
point that it is morally justifiable 
and obligatory to practice bene-
ficent euthanasia in some cases 
where the person killed does not 
choose death, is not dying, and is 
not in pain. It is very difficult to 
see why this would not justify 
involuntary euthanasia. Suppose, 
however, that Kohl is not both-
ered by this, as indeed he should 
not be. The next question that 
arises is that of procuring agree-
ment as to the narrowness or 
broadness of the categories of per-
sons to be appropriate candidates 
for mercy killing. Presumably the 
criterion that would for Kohl keep 
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the category of cases narrowly 
defined is that of preserving the 
dignity of human beings. A child 
born without limbs, sight, hear-
ing, or a functioning cerebral cor-
tex, although not in pain and not 
dying, is for Kohl lacking in dig-
nity or, in any event, will be 
treated with dignity when pain-
lessly put to death. 
Some people have argued that 
mongoloids, however happy and 
however in some instances educa-
ble, are also lacking in dignity so 
that their lives need not always 
be sustained even when they 
could be. What the "wedge" ar-
gument is saying is that there is 
no logical or easily agreed upon 
reason why the range of cases 
should be restricted to Kohl's 
paradigm or why it would not be 
beneficial to extend the range 
even beyond the retarded. For 
example, we have instances where 
quadriplegics who are fully con-
scious and rational are not asked 
whether they wish to live or die 
but are drugged and deprived of 
life support so that they die. The 
justification for this is logically 
the same as the justification for 
beneficent euthanasia in the case 
of the severely retarded. The 
physicians consider the life of a 
quadriplegic to be undignified or 
one of suffering or, at least, a life 
not worth living. These physicians 
certainly see themselves as acting 
out of kindness. 
The point of the "wedge" argu-
ment is very simple. Killing is 
generally wrong. It should be kept 
to as narrow a range of exceptions 
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as possible. The argument for 
beneficent euthanasia, unlike ar-
guments for killing in self defense, 
applies logically to a wide range 
of cases and the reasons for keep-
ing the range of cases narrow are 
not reasons on which people will 
easily agree. In short, arguments 
for beneficent euthanasia apply 
logically to either a narrow or a 
wide range of cases. Whether 
beneficent euthanasia will be ap-
plied to a narrow range of cases 
does not depend simply on how 
kind a society is. I t will depend 
also on the various notions that 
are held as to what constitutes a 
dignified or meaningful human 
life. About this there will be wide-
spread differences of opinion, 
many of them based on implicit 
or explicit theological assump-
tions. 
Furthermore, the " wedge" ar-
gument w 0 u I d warn against 
adopting a principle of minimizing 
suffering and maximizing kind-
ness. It sounds right but its logi-
cal implications go far beyond the 
intentions of a Marvin Kohl. If 
minimizing suffering is linked 
with killing, we have the unfortu-
nate implication that killing is a 
quicker, more painless way to al-
leviate suffering than the provi-
sion of companionship for the 
lonely and the long-term care for 
those who are either dying or re-
cuperating from long-term ill-
riesses. ' 
Clearly, Kohl does not want to 
minimize suffering by resort to 
killing but only by resort to kill-
ing out of kindness. The question 
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remains, then, whether killing out 
of kindness can be maximized 
without involving a much wider 
range of cases than Kohl envis-
ages. I shall come back to the 
question about whether mercy 
killing restricted to a narrow 
range of cases in accord with 
Kohl's paradigms is something 
that should be justified despite 
the very telling difficulties raised 
by the "edge of the wedge" argu-
ment. 
(2) Euthanasia as Unjust 
Kohl argues that beneficent eu-
thanasia is consistent with justice 
because it meets a basic need for 
dignity and self-respect. Such 
dignity is clearly exercised when 
people ask for a quick and pain-
less death in circumstances where 
they see only pain and suffering 
as their lot. But Kohl does not 
want to restrict euthanasia to in-
stances where consent can be ob-
tained. Sometimes, he contends, 
neither justice nor dignity is 
served when the misery of an in-
dividual increases and consent is 
not possible. 
Here again we see that there 
are instances in which Kohl would 
claim the inducement of a pain-
less, quick death confers dignity 
where otherwise there is none. As 
we noted previously, it is difficult 
to know how wide a range of cases 
should be included among those 
w:here dignity is obtained through 
a non-voluntarily induced, pain-
less death. Those who induce this 
death will no doubt have varying 
notions as to what kind of misery 
and how much of it renders a life 
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undignified. This is precisely what 
the "wedge" argument is worry-
ing about. If euthanasia is prac-
ticed on others by someone like 
Kohl, it will be used as a last re-
sort. If, however, there is a gen-
eral policy of considering bene-
ficent euthanasia a moral obliga-
tion and hence also existing laws 
that permit people to live up to 
their obligations, the practices 
may be quite different from those 
that Kohl would envisage and 
sanction. This would not be true 
because kill i n g is contagious 
(Kohl has quite properly objected 
to that argument) but because 
the notion of dignity is open to a 
very wide range of meanings. It is 
also true as we noted previously 
that agreement as to what confers 
dignity is difficult to obtain. In 
any event, those who advocate 
beneficent e u t han a s i a should 
clearly specify what they mean by 
dignity and how they justify their 
invocation of that term. 
(3) The Obligation to Avoid 
Killing 
Kohl recognizes that there are 
some who can argue that one is 
not obligated to help the suffer-
ing in every way possible, par-
ticularly if such help entails kill-
ing. On Kohl's view, an important 
assumption in that argument is 
that cruelty is to be avoided. Kohl 
contends that beneficent eutha-
nasia also seeks to avoid cruelty. 
The difference between opponents 
and proponents of euthanasia 
here is over the meaning of what 
constitutes cruelty and whether 
or not avoidance of cruelty IS 
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morally sufficent. Kohl argues 
that those who oppose euthanasia 
on grounds that it is cruel inter-
pret cruelty in a narrow sense to 
mean deliberately causing un-
necessary pain or harm. They do 
not use the broader sense of the 
term cruelty which refers to de-
liberately causing or allowing 
needless pain or harm. As a con-
sequence, Kohl argues, these op-
ponents of euthanasia are too 
prone to tolerate or excuse hu-
man misery. 
Kohl calls this desire to avoid 
cruelty a "taboo" morality. It 
tells us what not to do but not 
what to do. A society that avoids 
cruelty is admittedly better than 
one that does not. However, this 
"taboo" morality is contrary to 
the ideal of the Good Samaritan 
who, unlike those who walk past 
the injured or the sick, seeks to 
help. Aversion to cruelty may not 
harm anyone, but it is not a suf-
ficient principle of action if it does 
not include the obligation to help 
and be beneficent to others. 
These arguments by Kohl are 
rat her uncharacteristic of his 
usual fa i r n e s s to opponents. 
Those who oppose euthanasia be-
cause it is an act of killing share 
with the Good Samaritan the con-
cern to care for somebody who is 
or may be dying. That is surely 
one of the major reasons for op-
posing euthanasia, namely to care 
for people who are still alive and 
to help them to make the most of 
life, relieving pain and suffering 
as much as is possible without 
purposely killing them. Kohl is 
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assuming that the Good Samari-
tan ideal of practicing mercy 
views what is merciful in exactly 
the same way as he does in advo-
cating beneficent euthanasia. Pre-
sumably, if the dying man on the 
road to Jericho had asked the 
Good Samaritan to help him by 
making his death painless and 
quick, the Good Samaritan would 
have been obligated to do so, de-
pending upon whether he felt that 
the injured man was indeed dy-
ing. 
We see then how we have come 
about full circle. In effect, Kohl 
is taking the position that only 
proponents of euthanasia wish 
postively to exercise mercy where-
as opponents of euthanasia are 
simply trying to avoid doing 
something wrong and are so bent 
on it that they are not willing or 
able to be merciful. Whether or 
not one favors euthanasia and 
whether or not it is considered an 
obligation would seem, then, to 
depend on one's notion of what is 
merciful. The very understanding 
of a powerful paradigm case of 
mercy, the Good Samaritan ideal, 
is in dispute. Does the Good Sa-
maritan ideal expect mercy of us 
in the form of mercy killing as 
Kohl argues? I think not. Within 
the space allotted, it is not pos-
sible to do more than sketch some 
of the main contours of a policy 
that accepts the Good Samaritan 
ideal of mercy as a moral obliga-
tion but rejects beneficent eu-
thanasia or mercy killing as a 
form of it. 
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The Good Samaritan Ideal: 
An Ethic of Benemortasia 
Because euthanasia no longer 
functions as a merely descriptive 
term for a happy or good death, it 
is necessary to invent some term 
for this purpose. I have chosen 
the word "benemortasia" which is 
derived from two familiar Latin 
words, bene (good) and mors 
(death). What bene in benemor-
tasia means depends upon the 
ethical framework that one adopts 
in order to interpret what it is to 
experience a good death or at 
least what would be the most 
morally responsible way to be-
have in the face of death, either 
one's own or that of others. The 
ethic of benemortasia being sug-
gested in this essay is one such 
ethical framework built upon a 
conception of mercy that suggests 
policy alternatives to beneficent 
euthanasia. 
The ethic of benemortasia I 
wish to commend to the reader 
recognizes mercy or kindness as 
a moral obligation. Mercy is un-
derstood in at least two ways: 
First, it is merciful not to kill; 
secondly, it is merciful to provide 
care for the dying and the ir-
remediably handicapped. 
The injunction not to kill is 
part of a total effort to prevent 
the destruction of human beings 
and human communities. It is a 
universal prohibition in the sense 
that no society can be indifferent 
about the taking of human life. 
Any act, insofar as it is an act of 
taking a human life, is wrong, 
that is to say, taking a human life 
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is a wrong-making characteristic 
of actions.9 
Within the history of the West, 
the necessity for a prohibition 
against killing was recognized un-
der intensely dramatic circum-
stances. A band of slaves finds 
itself in the midst of a desert, 
having escaped from oppression. 
These slaves must pull together 
or perish together under the most 
harsh conditions. As the very 
basis of their community, these 
slaves, now free, chose to unite 
themselves around certain ,defi-
nite constraints, including the 
pledge not to kill one another. 
The acknowledged leader of this 
community was characterized as 
one who heeds the cries of the 
oppressed and delivers from op-
pression. Those who have been · 
liberated from their bondage now 
pledge themselves not to injure 
one another in the form of steal-
ing, bearing false witness, infi-
delity, or killing. T his newly 
formed community bound to-
gether by what has come to be 
known as the Mosaic Covenant 
placed itself under the judgment 
of the most powerful force for 
justice that they could imagine, 
so strong was the devotion to jus-
tice and to the mercy that deliv-
ers the powerless from the power-
ful. 
In the story of the Good Sa-
maritan, a lawyer allegedly con-
fronted Jesus with a question, 
namely, "what must I do to in-
herit eternal life?" In other words, 
what must I do if I am to attain a 
complete life, one in which I re-
alize myself to the utmost? Jesus 
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inquired whether he knew the law 
and the lawyer said he did. To 
show that he did, the lawyer pro-
vided Jesus with a summary of 
the law well known to Jesus at 
that time: "You shall love the 
Lord your God with all your 
heart and all your might, and 
your neighbor as yourself." The 
lawyer did not recite the whole 
Mosaic Covenant, but there is no 
question that the summary that 
he gave included and was meant 
to include the notion that one 
should not kill one's neighbors. 
(The sentences in quotation 
marks in this and the next para-
graph are paraphrases from Luke 
10:25-37.) 
What is often forgotten about 
the story of the Good Samaritan 
is that Jesus is reportedly com-
pletely satisfied with this reply 
by the lawyer. In effect he tells 
him that he is in great shape. 
"You know the law, you know 
you are not supposed to kill or 
steal, and you know that you are 
on the side of rectifying injustice. 
If you live in accord with this, 
you have got everything a person 
could ever want, nothing less than 
eternal life." Within the context, 
then, of this incident, Jesus in no 
way questions the Mosaic Cove-
nant or its applicability as a form 
of kindness to one's neighbor. "If 
you wish to love your neighbor, 
do not kill him." 
But the lawyer seems to be a 
very contemporary figure because 
he asks the question that keeps 
getting asked over and over again 
today: who is my neighbor? Who 
are the ones that I am to love by 
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restraining myself against acts of 
killing, stealing, and the like? 
It is at this point that Jesus 
introduces the well-known story 
about the Samaritan who while 
on the road to Jericho, unlike oth-
ers who pass by, stops to aid a 
person who is half dead, having 
been robbed, beaten, and left to 
die. There is no suggestion in this 
story that one should think in the 
least about whether the dying 
person qualifies for care. Indeed, 
after telling the story, Jesus asks 
the lawyer who was the neighbor 
to the one who was in need. The 
lawyer grasps the point of the 
story and says it was the Samari-
tan as contrasted with those who 
had walked by without caring at 
all for the wounded person. In 
short, neighbors are people who 
care. As the story puts it, the Sa-
maritan was the one who showed 
mercy. 
The Good Samaritan ideal, 
therefore, understands mercy in 
two ways: as a pledge not to kill 
one's neighbor, and as a pledge to 
be the kind of person who pro-
vides care for those who need it. 
There is nothing in the story that 
suggests that there is anyone who 
is beyond our care or that one can 
claim that someone in need does 
not qualify for it. And certainly 
there is nothing in the story that 
suggests that killing is a form of 
mercy. 
Advocates of beneficent eutha-
nasia would generally agree that 
one should not kill innocent peo-
ple, particularly those who are as 
powerless to defend themselves as 
the dying and the handicapped, 
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and also that people in need 
should receive care. They are 
skeptical about the kind of care 
that can and will be provided to 
relieve pain and suffering by 
those who reject mercy killing. 
Our ethic of benemortasia offers 
at least the following kind of care 
to patients who are considered to 
be imminently dying: (1) relief of 
pain; (2) relief of suffering; (3) 
respect for patients' rights to re-
fuse treatment; and (4) provision 
of health care regardless of ability 
to pay. 
(1) Relief of Pain 
There is widespread agreement 
among those who oppose bene-
ficent euthanasia but who believe 
in mercy that pain relief should 
be made available to patients even 
when it means shortening the dy-
ing process. This is not considered 
killing or assisting in a killing 
because the cause of death is the 
terminal illness of the patient, 
and the shortening of the dying 
process has to do wi th a choice 
on the part of patients to live 
with less pain during their last 
days. All of us make choices about 
whether or not we will seek pain 
relief. While we are not terminally 
ill, we also make choices about 
the kind of care we do or do not 
seek. There is no reason to deny 
such freedom to someone who is 
dying. Indeed, there is every rea-
son to be especially solicitous of a 
person whose days are known to 
be numbered. There is no legal or 
moral objection to the adminis-
tration of pain relief provided it 
is for that purpose and not for the 
purpose of killing someone. This 
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means that one does not know-
ingly give an overdose of pain re-
lief, but rather concentrates on 
dosages that are sufficient for re-
lief of pain, knowing that at some 
point the final dose will be admin-
istered. Official Roman Catholic 
hospital regulations in this coun-
try explicitly permit hastening 
the dying process through the ad-
ministration of pain relief. 
(2) Relief of Suffering 
Suffering is not the same as 
pain although in instances where 
pain is extremely excruciating, it 
is virtually impossible to avoid 
suffering. We know, for example, 
that physicians can relieve suffer-
ing in a variety of ways. There is 
some evidence that patients who 
know they are dying generally 
suffer less and are less inclined to 
ask for pain relief than those who 
do not know that they are dying. 
We know also that one of the ma-
jor sources of suffering of dying 
people can come from loneliness 
and lack of companionship. Our 
ethic of benemortasia would con-
sider it not only merciful but part 
of good care in the strictest medi-
cal sense to make provision for 
companionship, whether wit h 
medical , para-medical, or other 
kinds of persons brought to the 
hospital expressly for this pur-
pose. Churches and other volun-
tary organizations often assist in 
,,' these ".ways .. ",Elisabej;h Kubler-
Ross, l(J who is an opponent of 
beneficent e u t han a s i a but a 
staunch proponent and practi-
tioner of mercy in the form of re-
lief of suffering, has provided one 
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important model of care for dying 
persons. 
(3) Patients' Rights to Refuse 
Treatment 
Dying patients are also living 
patients. They retain the same 
rights as everyone else voluntarily 
to leave the hospital or to refuse 
specific kinds of care. Indeed, this 
right is legally recognized. No 
new law is required to allow pa-
tients to exercise their rights. One 
of the important good effects of 
the whole discusion of euthanasia 
is that all of us, including health 
professionals, are becoming more 
sensitive to this right to refuse 
care. Given the concern not to 
kill, one would continue to expect 
that physicians who hold there is 
some hope of saving a life, would 
usually presuppose consent of 
their patients to strive for their 
lives even where such patients 
may be expressing a wish to die. 
Many desperately sick people 
have despaired of life temporarily 
but are later grateful to be alive 
and well. 
Those who are irreversibly co-
matose or those who as in Kohl's 
paradigm have no functioning of 
the cerebral cortex, no use of 
muscles, etc., pose special diffi-
culties both for an ethic of bene-
ficent euthanasia as well as an 
ethic of benemortasia. Weare 
dealing in these instances with 
'" very tragic cir,c,umstances. N o",de-
cision we make is totally satis-
factory from a moral point of 
view. From the standpoint of our 
ethic of benemortasia, there is a 
strong presumption to continue to 
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support the irreversibly comatose 
and the severely brain-damaged 
until there is no reasonable hope 
of sustaining life apart from meas-
ures that go far beyond ordinary 
care. There comes a point where 
the decision to stop useless in-
terventions can be made out of 
mercy and also out of the recogni-
tion that for the irreversibly co-
matose, death is inevitable, and 
that for the s eve rei y brain-
damaged child, it will be merciful 
to withdraw from more than ordi-
nary care in the face of the next 
serious bout of illness where such 
episodes will be frequent and 
devastating. The difference be-
tween beneficent euthanasia and 
our ethic of benemortasia is that 
whereas the former would deliber-
ately induce death, the latter as a 
last resort, after making every ef-
fort to save and repair life, mer-
cifully retreats to simple care in 
the face of death's inevitability. 
(4) Universal Health Care 
In order to be merciful as well 
as just in the provision of care for 
dying and severely handicapped 
people, no single person or family 
should have to bear alone the bur-
den of extensive medical costs. It 
is notorious that poor people are 
more often and much sooner let 
go as dying persons than those 
who have ample financial re-
sources. Those concerned with 
mercy should also bear in mind 
that the much higher rates of ma-
ternal and infant death suffered 
by blacks is one of the more sub-
tle, systemic ways in which a so-
ciety permits euthanasia. It is 
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difficult to imagine that one 
could call such subtle forms of 
euthanasia in any sense merciful 
or beneficent. Discussions of bene-
ficent euthanasia should not over-
look these injustices to people in 
need of care. 
So far in discussing our ethic 
of benemortasia, we have stressed 
the ways in which mercy can be 
extended to patients without in-
ducing death. However, the pro-
ponents of beneficent euthanasia 
would not be completely satisfied 
in all cases with the form that 
mercy takes in our ethic of bene-
mortasia. Kohl emphasizes a 
quick, painless death. Our ethic 
of benemortasia emphasizes er-
ring on the side of the protection 
of life while still minimizing suf-
fering. In order to understand 
this remaining difference between 
beneficent euthanasia and our 
ethic of benemortasia, it is neces-
sary to see that they differ with 
respect to their notions as to what 
constitutes human dignity. 
Proponents of beneficent eu-
thanasia, including Kohl, tend to 
rest their case on the following 
kinds of presuppositions: 
(1) That the dignity that at-
taches to personhood by 
reason of the freedom to 
make moral choices de-
mands also the freedom to 
take one's own life or to 
have it taken when this 
freedom is absent or lost; 
(2) That there is such a thing 
as a life not worth living, 
a life which lacks dignity, 
whether by reason of dis-
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tress, illness, physical or 
mental handicaps, or even 
sheer despair for what-
ever reason; 
(3) That what is sacred or su-
preme in value is the "hu-
man dignity" that resides 
in man's own rational ca-
pacity to choose and con-
trol life and death. 
Our ethic of benemortasia as 
outlined here presupposes the fol-
lowing kinds of presuppositions 
about human diginity : 
(1) That the dignity that at-
taches to personhood by 
reason of the freedom to 
make moral choices in-
cludes the freedom of dy-
ing people to refuse non-
cura tive , life-prolonging 
interventions when one is 
dying, but does not extend 
to taking one's life or caus-
ing death for someone who 
is dying be c a use that 
would be unjustified kill-
ing; 
(2) That every life has some 
worth; 
(3) That notions of dignity are 
judged on the basis of 
what is right, merciful, and 
just, obligations which the 
dying and those who care 
for the dying share. Less 
than perfectly good beings, 
human beings, require con-
straints upon their deci-
sions regarding those who 
are dying. No human be-
ing or human community 
can presume to know who 
deserves to live or to die. 
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From a religious perspec-
tive, some would leave that 
kind of decision to GOd. 11 
There are two very critical dif-
ferences in these two sets of pre-
suppositions. Whereas in the ethic 
of beneficent euthanasia, life of a 
certain kind or life having dignity 
is what has value, in our ethic of 
benemortasia, life as such retains 
some value whatever form it 
takes. The dying or handicapped 
person is always worth caring for. 
Another critical difference be-
tween the two ethical views we 
are comparing is that the notion 
of mercy in our ethic of benemor-
tasia is controlled by what is con-
sidered right, parlicularly the in-
junction not to kill on which a 
wide moral and social consensus 
exists. The notion of mercy in an 
ethic of beneficent euthanasia as 
depicted by someone like Kohl 
and also Joseph Fletcher I 2 is con-
trolled by the conception of hu-
man dignity. One of the reasons 
that Kohl and Fletcher insist up-
on inducing death and making it 
come quickly is that certain lives 
are quite undignified and only be-
come dignified in death. It is for 
this reason that someone like 
Fletcher can speak of a right to 
die. 
It is precisely this appeal to 
some notion of dignity to justify 
killing which evokes "wedge" ar-
guments. As I indicated previous-
ly, there are serious and wide-
spread differences among people 
as to what constitutes human dig-
nity. If who shall live and who 
shall die is made contingent upon 
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these widely divergent views of 
human dignity, moral and legal 
policies that justify mercy killing 
can in principle justify a very nar-
row and/ or a very wide range of 
instances in which it will be 
claimed we as a society are ob-
ligated to kill someone. 
The debate concerning what 
constitutes human dignity is not 
one that can be easily resolved. 
There are deep philosophical and 
religious differences that divide 
people here. The injunction not 
to kill is not divisive in this way. 
A great deal of the emotion gen-
erated by the debate over eutha-
nasia finds its source precisely in 
the understandable and deep un-
easiness of a great number of in-
dividuals when they are asked to 
move away from a stringent notion 
of refraining from acts of killing 
regarding which there is wide-
spread agreement, and to make 
judgments about who shall live 
and who shall die on the basis of 
conceptions of human dignity re-
garding which there are deep re-
ligious, ethnic, philosophical, and 
other differences. To argue for 
beneficent euthanasia is to invite 
and stir up religious controversy 
and to threaten human trust and 
cooperation. To argue for the 
Good Samaritan ideal is to affirm 
the very basis of human com-
munity, namely, mercy that re-
, frains"from killing and that' ex-
tends care to ·those who need it. 
The ethic of the good death 
(benemortasia) is also the ethic 
of the good life. 
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